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Powerful local elites are quite common in developing countries. Thus, whether 
decentralization reduces or not the level of corruption in the presence of these 
elites is a relevant issue for these economies. We motivate this paper with 
some empirical evidence. Using cross-country information we find that the 
negative average effect of decentralization on corruption documented in the 
literature is absent for developing countries. Then, we build an imperfect 
information model of corruption and political accountability to study if the 
influence local elites may have on the allocation of public resources can explain 
this outcome. We find that not only the power of the elites but also other 
unexpected factors matter. In particular, both the existence of regions with a 
relatively weak accountability sector and the design of decentralization and 
grants can also explain the lack of success of decentralization in combating 
corruption in these economies. 
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DESCENTRALIZACIÓN, CORRUPCIÓN Y CONTROL POLÍTICO 





La existencia de elites poderosas a nivel local es muy común en los países en 
vía de desarrollo. Saber si la descentralización reduce los niveles de corrupción 
cuando existen estas elites es importante para estas economías. Para motivar 
este artículo se presenta evidencia empírica que soporta la hipótesis de que la 
descentralización no posee ningún efecto sobre el nivel de corrupción en los 
países en vías de desarrollo. Para ver si este resultado se puede explicar por la 
existencia de elites locales, se construye un modelo de información asimétrica 
de corrupción y control político. El modelo muestra que no solo el poder de las 
elites locales sino otros factores inesperados son importantes para explicar 
este resultado. En particular, la existencia de regiones con un sector de 
fiscalización débil, junto con el diseño de la descentralización y las 
transferencias, pueden explicar la falta de existo de la descentralización para 
combatir la corrupción  en estas economías. 
  
Palabras clave: Descentralización, corrupción, control político, captura, elites 
locales. 
 
Clasificación JEL: H77, D73, H72. 
   3
1. Introduction 
 
An important part of the literature on fiscal federalism has cared on the potential 
benefits decentralization may have on corruption. The main question to this respect is 
whether or not decentralization promotes good governance and persuades politicians 
against corruption. There is a partial agreement that decentralization reduces the level 
of corruption. This conclusion is based on both some well-known theoretical results and 
some of the empirical evidence available. 
 
Nevertheless, this is not the common perception in developing countries. Some authors 
have informally claimed that some idiosyncratic characteristics of these economies, 
such as the existence of powerful local elites, have not allowed decentralization to 
reduce the level of corruption. In this paper we study how the existence of these local 
elites affects the relationship between decentralization and corruption.   
 
The arguments that support the idea that decentralization reduces the level of 
corruption are based on at least two theories. First, jurisdictional competition 
discourages local governments from establishing distortionary policies that might drive 
away factors of production to less interventionist jurisdictions (Brenna and Buchanan, 
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Second, decentralization improves political 
accountability (Seabright, 1996). The idea behind this thesis is that decentralization 
grants the citizens of each region with the power to decide directly whether to re-elect a 
government or not, whereas centralization ensures that regions no longer have the 
same power in the re-election decision. This allows decentralization to encourage good 
governance. 
 
Other authors have claimed that decentralization may bring about more corruption in 
developing countries. The reason to think so is simple: those factors that allow 
decentralization to reduce corruption fail systematically in these economies. For 
instance, jurisdictional competition requires the existence of well-behaved common 
markets and that is not the rule in developing countries (Litvack et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, although in most of these countries popular election systems are 
established, powerful elites make difficult a broadly based local participation in 
elections (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1995). This issue obscures political accountability 
through elections and makes developing countries more vulnerable to corrupt 
bureaucracies.  
 
The empirical evidence about the relationship between decentralization and corruption 
also exhibits different results. One of the most representative studies in this field is due 
to Fisman and Gatti (2002). They work with a cross-section of 55 (developing and 
developed) countries. Their results show that more decentralization implies less 
corruption. However, Treisman (2000, 2002) finds the opposite result by using different 
measures of decentralization and quality of government.  
 
To motivate our discussion, we present some suggestive evidence about the 
relationship between decentralization and corruption in developing countries. In order 
to be consistent with the available evidence, we use the same sample, data set, 
decentralization definition, corruption index and econometric specification used by 
Fisman and Gatti (2002). We show that the negative effect that fiscal decentralization 
has on corruption in developed countries can not be confirmed in developing 
economies. In the rest of the paper, we formalize the idea that the lack of success of 
decentralization in combating corruption in these economies can be explained by the   4
existence of powerful local elites. In doing so, we find new elements that are relevant to 
understand this relationship.  
 
We start by developing and analyzing an incomplete information model of corruption 
and political accountability in a decentralized system. We understand corruption as the 
use of public resources for private gains. By political accountability, we mean the 
capacity of citizens to detect a corrupt incumbent and remove him from office
1. The 
game involves the voters of the jurisdiction, the respective incumbent, and a local elite 
that demands corruption from the office. The asymmetry in the model arises from the 
incumbent’s type (corrupt or non-corrupt). At election time, citizens cannot observe this 
type but only a signal about it. This signal is produced and sent by a local 
accountability sector. 
 
The accountability sector is an organized local group interested in good governance. 
This sector can be understood as a technology that invests all its resources in 
supervising the incumbent’s performance. These resources depend positively on the 
per capita income of the jurisdiction. We assume that the probability of detecting the 
incumbent in corruption increases as the resources of the accountability sector 
increase.  
 
In our framework, not only the accountability sector but also the elite can influence the 
political process by affecting the probability of detecting the incumbent in corruption. It 
can do it through two mechanisms. First, it can invest some resources in order to hold 
up the task of the accountability sector. In this way the elite reduces the probability of 
detection. Second, we assume the elite has economic control over a proportion of 
citizens. As this proportion increases, it is more difficult to detect the incumbent in 
corruption activities.  
 
If the incumbent is non-corrupt, then at equilibrium there is not corruption. The 
interesting case is that in which the incumbent is corrupt. If this is the case, we show 
that at equilibrium both the level of political accountability and the level of corruption 
are simultaneously determined by the power of the local elite, the per capita income of 
the jurisdiction, the incumbent’s office spoils, and the incumbent’s share in corruption – 
i.e. the proportion that incumbent reserves to himself from the resources allocated in 
corruption.  
 
To model the centralized case, we use the same framework described above. The 
novelty is that, under centralization, there is a local elite in each jurisdiction demanding 
corruption not to a local incumbent but to a central bureaucrat. This extension does not 
affect the equilibrium representation of the model. Thus, both the level of corruption 
and political accountability under centralization depend on the total power of the local 
elites at the national (federal) level, the national per capita income of the federation, the 
federal incumbent’s office spoils, and the federal incumbent’s share in corruption.  
  
Our aim is to study how corruption and political accountability change when a 
federation moves from a centralized to a decentralized system. We do so by analysing 
how the parameters of the model change between the federal (national) level and the 
jurisdictional level. We start by comparing the power of the elites at the national level 
against the power of the elite at the jurisdictional level. Our model predicts that, if the 
latter is larger than the former, then decentralization increases (reduces) the level of 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that this concept differs from the Seabright’s definition of accountability, which 
refers to the probability that the welfare of a region can determine the re-election of the government.   5
corruption (political accountability). The opposite happens if the latter is smaller than 
the former. The final effect of decentralization (via the elites' power) on national 
corruption and accountability is difficult to predict. It depends on the distribution of 
these powers across the jurisdictions and the initial level of corruption.  
 
The second relevant comparison is between the national and the jurisdictional per 
capita income. We show that, if the jurisdictional per capita income is larger than the 
federal per capita income, decentralization reduces (increases) the level of corruption 
(political accountability) if and only if the resources of the accountability sector grow 
above the locally generated taxes. Otherwise, decentralization increases (reduces) the 
level of corruption (political accountability). An analogous result is obtained if the 
jurisdictional per capita income is smaller than the national per capita income. Once 
again, the final effect of decentralization (via per capita income) on corruption and 
political accountability is ambiguous. It depends on the dispersion of income across the 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is not hard to think that corruption (political accountability) 
will increase (decrease) in many jurisdictions in developing countries, which usually are 
characterized by a relative weak accountability sector.    
 
An important corollary of this result has to do with the use of grants or transfers from 
the central government to the jurisdictions. Grants affect the amount of resources that 
an incumbent can allocate in his jurisdiction positively, but do not affect the amount of 
resources that the accountability sector has to invest on political accountability. When 
this happens, our model predicts an increment (reduction) in the level of corruption 
(political accountability). This is an important issue for developing countries, where the 
central governments use transfers intensively in order to reduce the high between-
jurisdiction income inequality.  
 
The third relevant element is the office spoils.  National office spoils are expected to be 
larger than jurisdictional office spoils, independently of the level of development. Our 
model predicts that under these circumstances, decentralization increases the level of 
corruption. Nevertheless, the effect on political accountability is ambiguous. Thus, the 
decentralization design also affects the level of corruption. For instance, the office 
spoils in small municipalities are farther from the national ones than the respective 
spoils in states. Therefore, when a federation is decentralized, corruption will increase 
more if it focuses on small jurisdictions than if it does on states. Decentralization in 
developing countries has allocated many tasks to small municipalities. 
  
The last key element is the incumbent’s share in corruption. Some authors (e.g. Tanzi, 
1995) have claimed that rewards to local politicians are relatively smaller than those 
received by central bureaucrats. Our model predicts that when this is the case and this 
share is not too high, decentralization reduces the level of corruption.  However, the 
effect on accountability is ambiguous. 
 
The final effect of decentralization on the nationwide level of corruption and political 
accountability depends on the combination of all the factors mentioned above. Thus, it 
is difficult to make a clear prediction about this effect. Nevertheless, our empirical 
evidence suggests that decentralization has not affected the level of corruption in 
developing countries. This outcome can be explained by the interaction of the 
parameters in our model.  
 
How local elites affect the relationship between corruption and decentralization has not 
been formally studied in the literature. The paper by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) is 
quite close to this issue. They investigate the determinants of relative capture of local   6
and national governments. However, in their model capture is produced on the political 
position of the government with respect to a public policy. Our model is more specific in 
terms of corruption. Here, elites do not influence explicitly the position of the 
government in a public policy but influence the allocation of public resources between 
public goods and corruption.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
motivation. Section 3 develops the decentralized framework, and section 4 analyses its 
comparative statics. Section 5 extents the model to the case of centralization, and 
section 6 studies how both the level of corruption and political accountability change 
when a federation is decentralized. Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains all 
proofs.   
 
2. Empirical  Motivation 
 
As we have already mentioned, one of the most representative empirical studies in this 
field supports the hypothesis that decentralization reduces corruption. However, 
whether or not the dissuasive effect of decentralization on corruption is systematically 
present in both developing and developed countries is an unexplored issue. In order to 
motivate our discussion, in this section we present some empirical evidence on that. 
 
To be consistent with the available evidence, we are going to use the same sample, 
data set, corruption indicator, and definition of decentralization used by Fisman and 
Gatti (2002) (hereafter F&G). The decentralization index corresponds to the ratio 
between the total expenditure of subnational (state and local) governments and the 
total spending by all government levels (state, local, and central). Correspondingly, the 
measure of corruption is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index. 
This index has been rescaled such that it lies between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates least 
corruption.  
 
We also work with the same basic econometric specification used by F&G, which 
assumes that corruption is a function of fiscal decentralization, per capita income, 
population, public sector’s size, and civil liberties. All the variables are averages for the 
period 1980-1995, except population which corresponds to a geometric average. The 
exact definition of the complete set of variables is given in the appendix.
2 In order to 
test our hypothesis, we allow for a different effect of decentralization in developed and 
developing countries. The results are reported in table 1. All the standard deviations of 







                                                 
2 There are three differences between the F&G’s data set and the one used here: (1) Population is taken 
from Heston, Summers and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, whereas F&G’s source is World 
Development Bank Indicators. (2) For government size (total government expenditure divided by GDP) 
F&G use Barro (1991)’s information. When we use this source the country sample is reduced in a high 
proportion, and it does not coincide with the F&G’s sample. Thus, we use government size from Heston et 
al., which additionally includes information for the whole period 1980-1995. (3) The GDP information used 
by F&G is in 1985 price, and the one used here is 1996 price.              7
Table 1 
OLS cross country estimates. Dependent variable: corruption, ICRG index (1980-
1995). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
F&G Our
estimation (a) replica
Decentralization Index (local 
and state share of total expen-
diture)
-0,42        
(-2,97)***
-0,52        
(-3,36)***
-0,67        
(-3,65)***
-0,62        
(-3,51)***
-0,69        
(-4,01)***
(Developing country dummy) x 
(Decentralization Index)     (b)
0,58        
(2,45)**
0,36        
(1,44)
0,45        
(2,26)**
Log of GDP -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 -0.12 -0.11
(-2,38)** (-3,13)*** (-2,05)** (-2,87)*** (-2,89)***
C i v i l  L i b e r t i e s 0 . 0 20 . 0 20 . 0 20 . 0 10 . 0 1
(1,47) (1,08) (1,17) (0,67) (0,48)
Log of population 0.011 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0,85) (2,06)** (1,72)* (1,48) (1,49)
Government size -1.07 -0.48 -0.46 -0.55 -0.54
(-3,33)*** (-2,08)** (-1,95)** (-2,33)** (-2,30)**
R-squared      0.69 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.69
Test statistics for decentraliza-
tion effect in developing coun-
tries equal to zero (P-value) 0.68 0.23 0.21
Number of obs. 55 56 56 56 56
(2) plus effect for developing countries
 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robustly estimated. The corruption index is 
rescaled to take values between 0 and 1, where 0=least corruption. All regressions are 
estimated with a constant term.  
(a) Taken from Fisman and Gatti (2002), Table 2, column (1), pp. 332.  
(b) The dummy for developing country changes in each column. Column (3): 1 if average GDP 
(1980-1995) < $6000, 0 otherwise; Column (4): 1 if average GDP (1980-1995) < $8000, 0 
otherwise; Column (5): 1 if average GDP (1980-1995) < $10000, 0 otherwise.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 present the F&G’s estimation and our replica respectively. The 
discrepancies should be due to the data differences discussed in footnote 2. The rest 
of columns introduce the interactions between the dummy for developing countries and 
the decentralization index. Columns 3 through 5 differ in the GDP level taken into 
account to define a developing country. From the estimations, it follows that 
decentralization reduces corruption significantly in developed countries, but that effect 
is totally reversed in countries with low income. In other words, we cannot reject in any 
regression the hypothesis that the effect of decentralization over corruption is null in 
developing countries. This result supports the idea that decentralization has not been 
decisive in reducing corruption in these economies. It is also interesting to note that, 
when we allow for differences between developed and developing countries, the 
decentralization effect becomes stronger in the former set of countries.
 3    
 
 
                                                 
3 Regressions in table 1 do not include the dummy for developing countries without interaction. Notice, we 
are controlling by GDP. When we introduce this dummy instead of GDP, we get the same conclusions. 
Since there is a high correlation between GDP and this dummy, when we introduce both in the 
regressions, the effect of decentralization disappears in both developed and developing countries.      8
Table 2 
IV cross-country estimates. Dependent variable: corruption, ICRG index (1980-1995). 
t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are robustly estimated. Corruption index is 
rescaled to take values between 0 and 1, where 0=least corruption. All regressions are 
estimated with a constant term.  
(a) The dummy for developing country changes in each column. Column (1): 1 if average GDP 
(1980-1995) < $6000, 0 otherwise; Column (2): 1 if average GDP (1980-1995) < $8000, 0 
otherwise; Column (3): 1 if average GDP (1980-1995) < $10000, 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Estimations in table 1 may present some endogeneity problems. As F&G observe, 
corrupt central governments can affect the composition of public spending. Thus, by 
keeping more rents in the centre, they can expand their rent extraction potential. As in 
F&G, we employ the legal origin of the country to instrument for the decentralization 
index.
4 The idea is that Civil legal codes (like the French) encourage government 
centralization, whereas Common systems (like the British) have the opposite effect. 
Thus, our instrument is directly correlated with the centralization index, and it is 
expected to affect corruption only through this effect.
5  
 
The IV estimations are reported in table 2. As before, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that decentralization does not affect corruption in developing countries. Additionally, 
even though we cannot reject the hypothesis that the LS estimator is consistent, the 
effect of decentralization on corruption in developed countries estimated by IV is larger 
than the respective effect estimated by LS. After correcting for endogeneity, our main 
conclusion remains the same, i.e. decentralization has an important effect in reducing 
corruption in developed countries, but this effect is not observed in less developed 
                                                 
4 There are five classifications: (1) English common Law; (2) Socialist laws; (3) French Commercial Code; 
(4) German Commercial Code; (5) Scandinavian Commercial Code (See the appendix).  
5 For an extended discussion about the validity of this instrument see Fisman and Gatti (2002) pp. 337. 
(1) (2) (3)
Decentralization Index (local and state share 
of total expenditure)
-1,10        
(-3,73)***
-1,03        
(-3,75)***
-0,96       
(-3,86)***
(Developing country dummy) x 
(Decentralization Index)     (a)
0,82        
(3,31)***
0,54        
(2,25)**
0,58        
(2,98)***
Log of GDP -0,04 -0,09 -0,09
(-0,99) (-2,12)** (-2,43)**
Civil Liberties 0,01 0,00 0,00
(0,63) (0,01) (0,03)
Log of population 0,04 0,03 0,03
(2,38)** (2,08)** (1,95)*
Government size -0,41 -0,55 -0,53
(-1,59) (-2,22)** (-2,20)**
R-squared      0,66 0,65 0,68
P-value: Test statistics for decentralization 
effect in deve-loping countries equals to zero  0,24 0,09 0,11
P-value: F-test statistics for join significance 
of instruments in first stage regressions 0,00 0,00 0,00
P-value: Hausman test for consistency 0,71 0,97 0,99
Number of obs. 56 56 56  9
economies. How can this outcome be explained? We care on this issue in the rest of 
the paper.     
 
3. The  Decentralized  Federation 
 
We start by analysing an incomplete information model of political accountability and 
corruption in a single jurisdiction, i.e. when the federation is totally decentralized. The 
game is played by the jurisdiction’s voters, their respective incumbent and one local 
elite. There is also an organized local group interested in good governance that is 
called the accountability sector. This sector is not a formal player in the game, but just 
an information technology. In the game, the local elite demands corruption from the 
incumbent (in form of public resources) in order to obtain private gains. The resources 




At the beginning of the game, there is an incumbent who is (exogenously) in office. 
This incumbent has an amount of resources τ(y) that should be invested in a public 
good  z but might go to corruption r.  τ  are the locally generated taxes, which are 
assumed to be a positive function of the regional income y (i.e.  0 ' > τ ). The unit price 
of the public good is normalized to be one. Thus, the incumbent budget constraint is 
r z + = τ . All these variables are measured in per capita terms. 
 
The incumbent can be of two types t ∈ {c,n}, where c stands for corrupt and n for non-
corrupt, with  γ = = ) n t Pr( . An incumbent of type n receives an infinitely negative 
utility from corruption; thus, he will always reject any corruption demand. An incumbent 
of type c receives a linear positive utility from corruption. For any unit of resources that 
he allocates to corruption to serve the elite’s demand, he will ask for himself an 
exogenous share β ∈ (0,1). We shall refer to β as the incumbent’s share. It can be 
understood as the incumbent’s share arising from a bargaining game between the 
incumbent and the elite. Thus, when incumbent accepts a level of corruption r, he will 
receive βr units of utility. The remaining (1-β)r will go to the elite. No matter his type, an 
incumbent gets spoils (“ego-rents”) S>0 if he stays in office.   
 
Accountability sector  
 
In our framework, political accountability is understood as the capacity of citizens to 
detect the incumbent in corruption and to remove him from the office. In the model 
there is an accountability sector that cares on improving political accountability in order 
to encourage good governance. You can think this sector is formed by civic 
associations, independent (non-influenced) media, and central government’s control 
offices. This sector is endowed with an amount of resources A that is totally invested in 
supervising the incumbent’s performance. These resources are also measured in per 
capita terms. We allow these resources to depend positively on the per capita 
jurisdiction’s income (y), then A=A(y) with  0 ' A > . 
  
The main task of the accountability sector is to send a signal to the citizens announcing 
whether the incumbent is corrupt or not. This sector can be understood as a technology 
that invests all its resources into accountability and makes an announcement about the 
incumbent’s type. In particular, it is not a formal player. We assume this sector is not   10





Let  ) z ( u  be the utility that voters receive from the public good supplied by the 
incumbent, with u strictly increasing. An incumbent of type n will provide a utility  ) ( u τ  
to the voters, whereas an incumbent of type c will deliver  ) r ( u − τ . After observing the 
outcome, voters must decide whether they re-elect the incumbent or randomly elect a 
candidate from the opposition whose type will be n with probability γ.  
 
Nevertheless, we assume that voters are not able to observe their payoff directly at the 
time of elections but only a signal from the accountability sector. If the incumbent’s type 
is  n, the accountability sector will receive and send a signal s=n. However, if the 
incumbent is corrupt, it will receive and send a signal s=c with probability δ ∈ [0,1], and 
s=n with probability 1-δ. Whit this information, the citizens vote in order to maximize 
their expected utility. The probability of detecting the incumbent in corruption (δ) will be 




The elite demands corruption r from the jurisdiction’s incumbent in order to produce 
some personal benefits. One can think in some specific project that affects the benefits 
on the elite directly and positively: licenses, public contracts, market interventions, etc.
6 
When the incumbent accepts the corruption demand, the elite receives the fraction 1-β 
of r. With this amount of resources, it is going to produce  ( ) r ) 1 ( Q β −  benefits, where 
0 ' Q > .  
 
We assume that the elite can influence the political process by affecting the probability 
of detecting the incumbent in corruption (δ). It can do it through two mechanisms. First, 
it can invest some resources H in order to hold up the task of the accountability sector. 
In this way the elite reduces δ. For instance, these resources may be spent on bribing 
other involved public workers, falsifying some documents, altering the account books, 
and so on. Second, the elite has economic control over a proportion θ ∈ [0,1/2) of 
citizens, which makes it more difficult to detect the incumbent in corruption activities. 
One can think that the elite has some monopsonistic power in the jurisdiction’s labor 
market and so it can induce these people to cover any signal of corruption. If this is the 
case, the resources invested by the accountability sector will be less productive as θ 
increases. We refer to θ as the elite’s power. 
 
To simplify, we assume the elite does not face any cost when it demands corruption to 
the incumbent. This implies that, if the incumbent’s type is n, the elite will not face any 
penalty if it insinuates a corruption agreement to the former. Assuming a linear Q(.), the 




                                                 
6 Notice that in some of these cases corruption may also affect the citizens’ welfare positively. However, 
since our analysis is not about welfare but about corruption, we do not care on these external effects.      11
Detection probability and accountability level 
    
Up to now there are three variables affecting the detection probability (δ): A, which is a 
function of y and has a positive effect on it; and H and θ, which affect δ negatively. In 
Addition to these three effects, we shall allow for a moral hazard component. This 
component takes into account the fact that the more rent is allocated to corruption as a 
proportion of the local taxes, the easier it is for the accountability sector to find out 
about corruption. To simplify the algebra, while preserving sufficient richness of 
structure, we will assume: 
 





− =     (1) 
 







. The four first assumptions ensure Ψ  belongs to the interval [0,1], and 
both the moral hazard probability and its marginal rate strictly increase in  τ r . The 
remaining are technical assumptions. Keep in mind that τ is a function of y, so 




As we mentioned earlier, political accountability in our framework is understood as the 
ability of citizens to detect the incumbent in corruption and remove her from office. One 
can be tempted to relate this concept directly to the detection probability. However, δ 
may not represent this concept accurately because of the moral hazard component. 
Consider the following situation. Imagine there is a variable that affects the level of 
corruption negatively and so  (.) Ψ , but, at the same time, it affects ( )() ) H A ( A 1 + −θ  
(the other part of δ) positively. When the first effect dominates the second effect, the 
final result is a reduction in δ.
8 If we do not make any distinction between the level of 
accountability and the detection probability, we conclude that the former also 
decreases. However, since in the new situation either elite has less influence on δ  (via 
H or θ) or the accountability sector is more effective or both, this conclusion is not right 
at all. 
 
Thus, in order to measure the degree of political accountability (δa), we remove the 











                                                 
7 Notice that if  τ = r ,  () ( ) 1 H A A 1 < + − = θ δ . However, although δ  is not equals one when the 
incumbent spends the total amount of taxes in corruption, this functional form allows us to obtain an 
interior solutions for the level of corruption. We could use equation 1 to define δ  if  τ < r  and set  1 = δ  if 
τ = r . It does not add any new to our results.     
8 As we shall see later on, the situation described in this example always holds.      12
Game and Equilibrium 
 
In order to keep the framework as simple as possible, we assume that an incumbent 
type  c does not extract rents without the elite participation. This allows us to 
concentrate on the corruption generated from the elite intervention. With the 
accountability group investing A in accountability, the timing of the game is as follows: 
 
Stage 1: Elite offers a contract  r , H  to the incumbent. 
Stage 2: The incumbent decides whether to accept (Y) or reject (N) the contract.  
Stage 3: Citizens observe the accountability sector signal and vote for the candidate 
(the incumbent or another candidate of unknown type) that maximizes their expected 
utility.  
 
The equilibrium of the game has two components. The first one is the game between 
the elite and the incumbent, which determines the levels of both corruption and political 
accountability. The second is the equilibrium in the election game, which establishes 
whether the incumbent is re-elected or not. To model the equilibrium in the corruption 
market, we focus on perfect Bayesian equilibrium restricted to pure-strategy equilibria 
in which citizens always vote for their preferred candidate.  
 
The complete description of the equilibrium strategies and proofs of the following 
propositions can be found in the appendix. Here, we state the equilibrium conditions 
when there is a positive level of corruption. We now introduce subscript j to denote 
jurisdictions and superscript d to denote outcomes and parameters under 
decentralization. 
       
Proposition 1. When incumbent is of type c, at equilibrium the incumbent always 
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where  () . A  and  () . τ  depend on  j y , and  () . Ψ  is evaluated at  () . r
d
j τ . Equation 3 
implicitly sets the equilibrium level of corruption in jurisdiction j (
d
j r ˆ ) under 
decentralization. This happens at the point in which the elite’s marginal income of 
corruption  ( )
d 1 β −  equals the elite’s marginal cost of corruption. Equation 4 sets the 
minimum level of 
d
j H  required by the incumbent to accept 
d
j r ˆ . At equilibrium, the 
public good supply, the accountability level, and the detection probability are given 
respectively by: 
   13
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From now on, we focus on the sort of equilibria with positive corruption (described in 
proposition 1), i.e. those in which the incumbent is of type c. This way we will be able to 
analyze how the level of corruption, the detection probability, and the level of 
accountability are affected when the parameters of the model change. At equilibrium, 
each of these three outcomes depends simultaneously on the jurisdiction income ( j y ), 
the offices spoils (
d S ), the elite’s power (
d
j θ ), and the incumbent’s share (
d β ). To 




First of all, we analyze the level of corruption. Notice that equation 3 sets an implicit 
function of corruption in terms of y, S, θ and β. Proposition 2 states the effect that each 
of these factors has on the level of corruption.  
 
Proposition 2. Assume there is positive corruption in the jurisdiction (i.e. equilibrium is 
described by proposition 1), then the level of corruption (r): 
a)  Decreases as the jurisdiction income (y) increases if and only if  A ' A ' ) 1 ( 1 < τ τ η , 
where 








=  ∈ (0,1). Otherwise, corruption increases. 
b)  Decreases as the office spoils increase (S). 
c)  Increases as the elite’s power increases (θ).  
d)  Increases as the incumbent’s share (β) increases if β<½, and decreases as β 
increases if β>½. 
 
The jurisdiction’s income affects the level of corruption through two channels. On the 
one hand, the amount of resources invested by the accountability sector in its task 
goes up as y increases. This influences corruption negatively via the increase in the 
elite’s marginal cost of corruption. On the other hand, the locally generated taxes (τ) 
also grow as y increases. Thus, for the same level of corruption, it produces a 
decrease in the ratio r/τ , which reduces the probability of detection (via the moral 
hazard probability) and encourages the demand for corruption. Since both things occur 
whereas the elite’s marginal income keeps constant, the final effect on the level of 
corruption will depend on which of the two effects on the marginal cost dominates the 
other. When the resources of the accountability sector increase more than the 
generated taxes (more precisely  τ τ η ' ) 1 ( A ' A 1 > ), the corruption marginal cost 
increases, and so the level of corruption decreases.  
 
The result in proposition 2(a) has an important implication for the accountability sector 
success. This says that if y increases, the resources invested in accountability must 
grow relatively faster than the generated taxes in order to get a reduction in the level of   14
corruption. This result can also be used to understand the role of grants in our 
framework. When there are transfers from the national to the jurisdictional level, the 
incumbent’s budget is positively affected whereas the accountability sector’s resources 
remain the same. In terms of our framework this implies  0 ' > τ τ , and  0 A ' A = . From 
proposition 2(a), it follows that, under these circumstances, the level of corruption 
increases.  
 
Some authors have previously claimed that a high level of grants incentives corruption 
and affects the fiscal performance in jurisdictions negatively. The explanation they have 
given to this effect is that local voters and local politicians receive fiscal or political 
benefits from grant programs without internalizing their full cost (Rodden, 2002). Our 
model exposes an alternative explanation for this phenomenon. Since transfers only 
increase the potential resources to be invested in corruption but do not affect the 
resources invested in accountability, they encourage corruption.   
 
Results (b) and (c) in proposition 1 are quite intuitive. In both cases, the marginal 
benefit of corruption keeps constant, but the marginal cost changes. When the office 
spoils (S) go up, the marginal cost of corruption increases, and then, corruption 
decreases. Alternatively, a rise in the elite’s power (θ) makes the accountability sector 
less efficient, reduces the marginal cost of corruption, and, as a result, corruption 
increases. 
 
Statement (d) says that if β is small enough and it increases, then corruption goes up. It 
is direct that the elite’s marginal income of corruption decreases as β increases. 
However, there is also a reduction in the marginal cost of corruption because the elite 
must now invest fewer resources in affecting the level of accountability in order to 
incentive the incumbent’s participation. If β is smaller than ½, then it will still be 
profitable for the elite to demand more corruption. Actually, this case is the most 
interesting, as it may properly reflect what occurs in the real world.        
 
It is also interesting to see how the public good supply is affected in all these cases. 
From equation 5, it immediately follows that public good supply increases whenever 
corruption decreases. The opposite is true when corruption increases as a result of a 
change in θ, S, or/and β. Nonetheless, when the increment in corruption is due to an 
increase in the jurisdiction’s income, the public good supply may go up or down 
depending on how both the resources of the accountability sector and the generated 




Now consider the detection probability. Proposition 3 states the results for the 
comparative statics. 
 
Proposition 3. Assume there is positive corruption in the jurisdiction (i.e. equilibrium is 
described by proposition 1). The probability of detecting the incumbent in corruption (δ): 
a)  Increases as the jurisdiction income (y) increases if and only if  A ' A ' ) 1 ( 1 > τ τ η  
(i.e. as the level of corruption increases); otherwise, it decreases. 
b) Increases as the office spoils (S) decrease (i.e. as the level of corruption 
increases). 
c)  Increases as elite’s power (θ ) increases (i.e. as the level of corruption increases).   15
d)  Increases as the incumbent’s share (β) increases if and only if  ) 2 1 ( β β Φ − − > , 
where  0 ) 1 ( 2 (.) ' ' ) 1 (




. Notice that if β<½, this condition 
always holds (i.e. it increases as the level of corruption increases).  
 
We must be careful in the interpretation of results in proposition 3. Essentially, all these 
results say that the detection probability increases whenever the level of corruption 
increases and vice versa. This is so because the moral hazard component always 
dominates the total effect over the detection probability. Thus, when r increases the 
moral hazard component goes up and so the detection probability
9.   
 
A direct way to see that the moral hazard probability dominates the final effect on δ is 
through the incumbent’s participation constraint. At equilibrium, this constraint implies 
S r ˆ ˆ β δ =  (See proof of proposition 3). Hence, keeping β and S constant, the detection 
probability increases whenever the level of corruption increases. When the changes in 
corruption stem from a variation in S, the final effect is strengthened by it. When it 
stems from a variation in β, the final effect will depend, among other things, on the 
value of β (as it is described in proposition 3(d)).               
 
Thus, as we have already discussed in section 3, it is better if we focus on an 
appropriate measure of political accountability. By doing so, we can see whether or not 
the voters are able to detect a corrupt incumbent not via the level of corruption but via 




Equation 2 shows that besides the direct effect of θ and y, the accountability level 
depends crucially on the elite’s investment H. The comparative statics’ results are 
stated in proposition 4.  
 
Proposition 4. Assume there is positive corruption in the jurisdiction (i.e. equilibrium is 
described by proposition 1). The level of political accountability (δa): 
a)  Increases as the jurisdiction income (y) increases if and only if 
A ' A ' ) 1 ( 2 1 < − τ τ η η , where  0
1








η . Otherwise, it 
decreases. 
b)  Can increase or decrease as the office spoils (S) increase. Only when the effect of 
S over r is large enough it increases. 
c)  Decreases as the elite’s power (θ) increases. 
d)  Increases as the incumbent’s share (β) increases if β>½. If β<½, it increases only if 
the effect of β over r is small enough. 
 
Statement (a) says that when the jurisdiction’s income increases, the resources of the 
accountability sector must grow at least  2 1 1 η η −  times the locally generated taxes in 
order to observe an increment in accountability. We cannot infer the sign of  2 1 1 η η −  
                                                 
9 This assertion is true when the rise in r is not due to an increment in y (if so, unambiguously r/τ 
increases). However, when r increases as a result of an increment in y, the ratio r/τ does not necessarily 
increase, and the final effect on the moral hazard probability is ambiguous. As proposition 3 shows, even 
in this case, the total effect on δ is also dominated by the change in r.           16
(see appendix), but since η2>0, it follows that  ) 1 ( 1 2 1 1 η η η − > . Then, the condition 
in proposition 4(a) is less demanding than the required condition to have a decrease in 
the corruption level (proposition 2(a)). Thus, an increment in accountability is not 
enough to observe a reduction in corruption.
10  
 
With the exception of θ, the other two parameters of the model (S and β) affect the 
level of accountability only through their effect on H. Thus, for a clearer intuition of 
statements (b), (c) and (d) in proposition 4, let us analyze the elite’s contribution to 
decrease the efficiency of the accountability sector. From equation 4, there are two 
forces affecting H as either S, or θ, or β change. One is the direct effect and the other is 
the effect through r - more specifically through the term  r (.) Ψ . Notice that this ratio 
can be interpreted as the moral hazard probability per unit of corruption. It is easy to 
show that, keeping constant y and so τ,  r (.) Ψ  strictly increases in r. Therefore, when 
this ratio goes up (i.e. r increases) the elite will be willing to raise H in order to 
compensate the increment in the detection probability. The final effect over H will 
depend on the combination of the direct effect and the effect through  r (.) Ψ .  
 
Come back to the interpretation of the statements in proposition 4. First, consider the 
effect of S on  a δ . Since it only operates through H, we concentrate on the relationship 
between S and H. Through the direct effect H increases as S increases. In other words, 
when the office spoils are large, the elite must invest more in affecting accountability in 
order to get the same level of corruption. However, since office spoils affect the level of 
corruption negatively, then  r (.) Ψ , and so H, decrease as S goes up. Therefore, in 
order to observe a reduction in H, and so an increment in the accountability level, it is 
necessary that the latter effect dominates the former. This implies a large enough 
impact of S over r (the appendix states the formal condition).  
 
Consider now the effect of θ on  a δ . Even though the adjustment in H is ambiguous 
when the elite’s power (θ) goes up (H decreases via the direct effect but increases 
since r increases), the direct effect of θ on  a δ  is enough to reduce the accountability 
level. This result depends crucially on the assumption that the accountability level 
depends directly and negatively on θ.  
 
Finally, consider the effect of β on δa. Once again, since it only operates through H, we 
concentrate on the relationship between β and H. When β affects corruption negatively 
(i.e. β>½), the two forces reduce H, and thus, the level of accountability increases. 
However, when β<½, its effect over H is ambiguous (H decreases via the direct effect 
but increases since r increases). Hence, in order to have an improvement in 
accountability, it is required that corruption does not increase excessively (the appendix 
states the formal condition).       
 
Summing up, we have found the following results. First, when the jurisdiction’s income 
increases, the level of corruption goes down and the accountability level increases if 
the accountability sector grows sufficiently above the locally generated taxes. Second, 
the office spoils affect the level of corruption negatively, but in order to affect the level 
of accountability positively a high enough impact over it is required. Third, the elite’s 
                                                 
10 For instance, when the level of accountability increases in a small proportion and the detection 
probability is still dominated by the moral hazard component, we can observe more corruption.     17
power affects corruption positively and the accountability level negatively. Finally, when 
β<½ - which actually is the most interesting case - an increment in the incumbent’s 
share increases the level of corruption but has an ambiguous effect on political 
accountability.  
 
5. The  Centralized  Federation 
 
So far, the model presented in section 3 describes how both corruption and political 
accountability are determined in each jurisdiction in a decentralized federation. In this 
section we consider the case in which the federation is totally centralized. In order to do 
so, we use exactly the same framework we introduced in section 3.  The main 
difference is that under centralization there is only one central incumbent in the 
federation who receives corruption demands from J>1 elites, one in each jurisdiction 
(where J is the number of jurisdictions). From now on, we use superscript c to denote 
parameters and outcomes under centralization.   
 
There are some issues we must take into account in this new framework. First, we are 
characterizing the national per capita level of corruption 
c r , i.e. the amount of 
resources allocated in corruption as proportion of the total population in the federation. 





c r r , where 
c
j r  is the amount of resources allocated in 
corruption in each jurisdiction j under centralization as proportion of the total population 





c H H , is defined in a similar way.    
 
Second, under centralization the relevant parameters are those at the federal level. For 
instance, the power of the elites is their total power at the federal level. We define 
c
j θ  
as the percentage of people that elite j controls in its jurisdiction as proportion of the 






c θ θ . The other relevant parameters are the national (federal) per capita 
income 
c y , the central (federal) office spoils 
c S , and the central incumbent’s share in 
corruption 
c β .  
 
Keeping in mind these changes, we define the probability of detecting the central 










c c τ Ψ θ δ
+
− =    (8) 
 
where  () . A  and  () . τ  depend on 
c y . 
 
The last issue has to do with the accountability sector. When the system moves from 
centralization to decentralization, we are implicitly assuming that the accountability 
sector is decentralized at the same time. In other words, we are imposing that under 
centralization there is one national accountability sector which supervises the central 
incumbent, whereas under decentralization there is one group in each jurisdiction 
carrying out this task. In order to avoid any extra effect, we keep the characteristics of   18
the accountability sector unchanged at the two levels, i.e. both the jurisdictional and the 
national sector use the same technology
11.      
 
The timing of the game is similar to that in the decentralization case: 




j r , H  to the central 
incumbent. 
Stage 2: The central incumbent decides if she accepts (Y) or rejects (N) each contract.   
Stage 3: Citizens observe the accountability sector’s signal and vote for the incumbent 
or for another candidate of unknown type. 
 
The equilibrium of this game is presented in the appendix. We show that the 
equilibrium characterization of the centralized case is exactly the same that in the 
decentralized case. In particular, when incumbent is of type c, the national level of per 





















β    (9) 
 
where Ψ(.) is evaluated at  τ
c r ˆ . Similarly, 
d H ˆ  and 
d
a ˆ δ  can be written using equations 
4 and 6 (see the appendix). 
 
It is important to notice that in our  decentralized game, the elites neither compete 
among them for the public resources nor collude in a single national elite. We do so in 
order to keep our framework as simple as possible. A way to introduce this kind of 
behaviors is through the bargaining power of the incumbent (β). If the elites compete 
for public resources, one can expect an increment in β as the system moves from 
centralization to decentralization. If they collude in a single elite, one can expect a 
reduction in this parameter. Actually, we shall discuss the effect of these changes latter 
on.     
 
6. Centralization  versus  Decentralization 
 
The aim of this section is to evaluate how both corruption and political accountability 
change when a federation moves from a centralized to a decentralized system. From 
the discussion in the previous section, the only difference between the two systems is 
the respective set of parameters { } β θ, , S , y . Thus, we can use the results in 
propositions 2 and 4 to analyze the expected change in the level of corruption and 
accountability when a federation is decentralized. Our analysis compares the national 
outcomes under centralization against the jurisdiction j’s outcomes under 







                                                 
11 This implies that the national and the jurisdictional accountability sector do not differ in its productivity. In 
our framework, one can easily introduce a parameter to take into account differences in these 
productivities. However, it does not add any interesting result.       19
Elite’s power 
 
When a federation moves from a centralized to a decentralized system, the relevant 
parameter of the elite’s power is not the total power of the elites at the federal level 
(
c θ ) but the power of each elite at the jurisdictional level (
d
j θ ). Notice that 
d
j θ  can be 
higher, equal, or smaller than 
c θ . Thus, if 
c d
j θ θ > , the level of per capita corruption 
(political accountability) in jurisdiction j under decentralization will be larger (smaller) 
than the national level of per capita corruption (political accountability) under 
centralization. The opposite will happen if  
c d
j θ θ < .  
 
The final effect of decentralization on the national level of corruption and political 
accountability depends critically on both the distribution of powers (
d
j θ ) across 
jurisdictions and the initial level of corruption. Table 3 presents an example for a 
federation formed by 3 jurisdictions, each of them with population equals 10. In each of 
the three cases, the respective elite in each jurisdiction controls a different proportion of 
people, but all of the elites control the same percentage of citizens (30%) at the 
national level.  
 
Table 3 
Example: Distribution of the elite’s power 
 
  Controlled Pop.   Elite’s power  
 
 
Pop.  I II  III  Power I II  III 
National  30 9 9 9 θ 
c  0.3 0.3 0.3 
j=1  10 4 4 3 θ1
d  0.4 0.4 0.3 
j=2  10 4 3 3 θ2
d  0.4 0.3 0.3 
j=3  10 1 2 3 θ3
d  0.1 0.2 0.3 
 
In case I, as the federation moves from centralization to decentralization, corruption 
increases in jurisdictions 1 and 2 (0.4>0.3) and decreases in jurisdiction 3 (the opposite 
happens with the level of accountability). In case II, corruption increases in 1, 
decreases in 3 and remains the same in 2. Finally, in case III the national level of 
corruption does not change when the federation is decentralized. This illustrates the 
fact that the distribution of powers across jurisdictions matters. The second issue has 
to do with the aggregation of these changes. Since the effect of the elite’s power on 
both corruption and accountability is not constant
12 and depends on the initial level of 
corruption, it is difficult to predict the final effect decentralization has on the national 
level of corruption and political accountability in cases I and II. 
 
We conclude that the final effect of decentralization – via the elites’ power - on 
corruption is ambiguous. Nevertheless, since elites play an important role in many 
jurisdictions in developing countries, one can expect a significant increment in the level 
of corruption in these municipalities after decentralization.  
                                                 
12 Assuming  0 (.) ' ' ' > Ψ , one can show that   0 r
2 2 > ∂ ∂ θ . However, the sign of 
2
a
2 θ δ ∂ ∂  is ambiguous 
(See appendix).    20
 
Per capita income 
 
To see the effect of decentralization - via per capita income - on corruption, we must 
compare the national per capita income (
c y ) against the per capita income of each 
jurisdiction  j ( yj).  This analysis makes sense if the federation has an important 
dispersion of income across jurisdictions. Such is the case in most developing 
economies.   
 
The per capita income in jurisdiction j may be higher, equal, or smaller than the 
national per capita income (y
c). Additionally, the change in per capita income when a 
federation moves from centralization to decentralization may affect the resources of the 
accountability sector and the generated taxes in a different proportion. Thus, in order to 
understand the effect of decentralization on both corruption and accountability, we 
need to consider all the possible situations that can arise. Table 4 summarizes these 
situations for the corruption outcome. For obvious reasons, the case in which 
c
j y y =  
is not reported. 
 
Table 4 
Effect of Decentralization -Via Per Capita Income- on Corruption 
 
 
a)  τ τ η ' 1 A ' A 1 >  
 
r  decreases 
Rich regions with a relatively 




j y y >  
 
 
b)  τ τ η ' 1 A ' A 1 <  
 
r  increases 
Rich regions with a relatively 
weak accountability sector 
 
c)  τ τ η ' 1 A ' A 1 >  
 
r  decreases 
Poor regions with a relatively 




j y y <  
 
 
d)  τ τ η ' 1 A ' A 1 <  
 
r  increases 
Poor regions with a relatively 
weak accountability sector 
 
 
When the per capita income in jurisdiction j is larger than the national per capita 
income, then  () ( )
c
j y A y A >  and  ( ) ( )
c
j y y τ τ > . Nevertheless, both the resources of 
the accountability sector and the locally generated taxes can be affected in different 
proportions. If  τ τ η ' 1 A ' A 1 > , i.e. the jurisdiction j is a rich region with a relative 
strong accountability sector (case (a) in table 4), the level of corruption in this 
jurisdiction under decentralization will be smaller than the national level of corruption 
under centralization. The opposite will happen if  τ τ η ' 1 A ' A 1 < , i.e. the jurisdiction j 
is a rich region with a relatively weak accountability sector (case (b) in table 4). Like 
table 4 shows, a similar analysis can be done when 
c
j y y <  (cases (c) and (d)). 
Similarly, using the result in proposition 4(c) one can analyse the effect of 
decentralization on political accountability.    
 
Once again, the final effect of decentralization (via per capita income) on the national 
level of corruption is ambiguous. It depends on how the jurisdictions are distributed 
among the four cases characterized in table 4. However, it is not difficult to think that 
most of the jurisdictions in developing countries can be classified in cases (b) and (d) 
i.e. regions with weak accountability sectors. Thus, our prediction is that the level of 
corruption (accountability) will increase (decrease) in an important proportion of   21
jurisdictions and only decrease (increase) in a few rich jurisdictions with a relatively 
strong accountability sector.      
 
Another issue to take into account is the use of grants or transfers under 
decentralization. In the presence of significant between-jurisdiction income inequalities, 
the design of central transfers plays an important role. As we mentioned in section 3, 
transfers affect the level of corruption positively. Since these inequalities across 
regions are relatively larger in developing countries than they are in developed 
countries, and because most of the developing countries use these transfers 
intensively to finance the poorest (the majority of) jurisdictions, the final effect of 
decentralization on the overall corruption may be positive. To avoid a re-escalation of 
corruption through the transfer system, its design must involve transfers to the 




Now consider the office spoils S. Since the effect of spoils on political accountability is 
ambiguous, we concentrate only on their effect on corruption. Office spoils in a 
jurisdiction (
d S ) are surely smaller than national ones (
c S ) everywhere around the 
world. From our results, this implies that, when the system moves from centralization to 
decentralization, there must be an increment in the level of corruption in every 
jurisdiction and so in the national level of corruption.  
 
A priory, there is not any significant difference between a developing and a developed 
country in this effect. Nevertheless, it is important to note that many developing 
countries have moved from a centralized to a decentralized system by assigning an 
important amount of decisions to small municipalities. Since the office spoils in small 
municipalities are farther from the national ones than the respective spoils in states, 
corruption is expected to increase more in those countries in which decentralization 
focuses on small jurisdictions than in those in which it focuses on states. Thus, the 




Since the effect of β on the level of political accountability is ambiguous, once again we 
concentrate on its effect on corruption. We do not have any explicit expectation about 
the change of β as the economy moves from a centralized to a decentralized system. 
Some authors (e.g. Tanzi, 1995) have claimed that rewards to local politicians are 
relatively smaller than those received by central bureaucrats, i.e. 
d c β β > . If this is the 
case, the common perception is that the level of corruption under decentralization must 
be larger than the respective level under centralization. This should be so because 
local governments are cheaper than the central government.  
 
Assume 
d c β β > . We have shown that if β has a rational value (i.e. β<½), and it 
decreases, corruption is expected to be smaller in every jurisdiction under 
decentralization. In other words, if 
d c β β > , then decentralization reduces the level of 
corruption in the federation. This result is opposite to the informal perception mentioned 
above. The reason is that we are taking into account the strategic behaviour of the 
elite. As the incumbent’s share decreases, the elite’s marginal income of corruption (1-
β) increases. If β is small enough, the elite has to invest fewer resources (H) in order to   22
persuade the incumbent, and then the level of corruption decreases to recover the 
equilibrium condition in equation 4.  
 
The analysis carried out in this section indicates that several factors affect the 
relationship between decentralization and corruption. Depending on both how these 
forces operate in each jurisdiction and how the jurisdictional outcomes are distributed 
across the federation, one can observe either an increment or a reduction in the 
nationwide level of corruption. Nevertheless, the evidence presented in section 2 
suggests that decentralization has not been decisive in reducing the level of corruption 
in developing countries. This outcome can be explained by the opposite effects that our 




There is a partial agreement in both theoretical and empirical literature that 
decentralization reduces the level of corruption. We have shown in this paper that this 
is the case in developed countries in which the mechanisms that allow decentralization 
to incentive good governance work properly. However, because such mechanisms 
usually fail in developing countries, it is not more the case for these economies. 
 
As we have shown, the power of local elites in these countries may be one of the 
aspects that reduces political accountability and encourages bad governance. Thus, 
the implementation of policies that affect this power negatively can be useful in order to 
reduce corruption. For instance, if there is an important degree of monopsony in the 
labor market, it may be required to promote industrial or agricultural competition and to 
foster between-jurisdiction migration. 
 
Although we emphasize the negative impact that local elites have on both the degree 
of political accountability and the level of corruption, there are other factors that have 
not allowed decentralization to work appropriately in developing countries. For 
instance, the existence of regions with a relatively weak accountability sector can 
explain this issue. Another important aspect is the high between jurisdiction income 
inequality in these countries, which intensifies the use of transfers in order to finance 
the poorest regions. We have shown that these grants affect corruption positively if the 
transfer system does not involve any improvement in the productivity of the 
accountability sector. Our theoretical results suggest that, in order to avoid corruption, 
any increase in the amount of transfers must be accompanied by a rise - at least as 
large as the rise in the transfers - in the amount of resources allocated to political 
accountability. 
 
Finally, most developing countries have moved from a centralized system to a 
decentralized system that assigns an important amount of decisions to small 
municipalities. In terms of our model, this implies a dramatic reduction in the office 
spoils which encourages corruption. In order to take advantage of the potential benefits 
of decentralization while persuading politicians against corruption, it may be useful to 
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Appendix 
 
In propositions 1 through 4 we omit the subscript j and the superscript c. 
 
Proof of proposition 1. The equilibrium strategies are: 
 








= − 2 r ˆ
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A H ˆ Ψ
β
θ
     ( A 2 )  
 
2.  An incumbent of type n rejects the contract, and an incumbent of type c accepts it.  
 
3.  Voters re-elect the incumbent if s=n; otherwise they do not re-elect the incumbent 
and vote for a challenger who is non-corrupt with probability γ. 
 
Now, we prove that the previous strategies characterize any pure-strategy perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium of the game. First, consider the voters’ behaviour whose 


















   (A3) 
 
To remove the incumbent from the office when s=c is a strictly dominant strategy. Now 
let’s assume s=n. If in this case voters do not re-elect the incumbent and choose a 
challenger, the latter will be non-corrupt with probability γ. Nevertheless, since 
() γ δ γ γ γ ≥ − − + ) 1 )( 1 (  for any δ ∈ [0,1], then to re-elect the incumbent is a strictly 
dominant strategy. 
    
Now consider the incumbent’s strategy. Since an incumbent of type n receives an 
infinitively negative utility from corruption she will always reject (N) any offer of the elite 
with positive corruption. Incumbent’s type c payoffs are  S ) N , c ( V =  if she rejects the 
elite’s contract, and  r ) r S )( 1 ( ) Y , c ( V δβ β δ + + − =  if she accepts it. Thus, she will 
accept any contract in which  ) N , c ( V ) Y , c ( V ≥ . This implies  S r β δ ≤ , which actually 
is the incumbent’s participation constraint.  
 
The elite maximizes its payoff  ( )( ) H r ) 1 ( 1 − − − = β γ π , subject to  S r β δ ≤  
















. Since π strictly decreases in H, then the incumbent will   25















. Notice this implies that at equilibrium the 
incumbent’s participation constraint holds with equality. We assume the parameters of 
the model are such that  0 H > , for that it is required that  S ) 1 (.)( r θ Ψ β − < . This 
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β γ π  
s.t.   τ ≤ ≤ r 0   
 
Equation A1 characterizes the first order condition (FOC) of this programme. Notice 
that 
2 a r a r r















, where a is any constant. Using 
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. Then, there is at least one interior solution for r. The second order 































From the FOC, the first term in the parenthesis of equation A4 equals to  ) 1 ( 2 β − . It 
follows that at any maximum 
2 AS (.) ' ' ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 τ Ψ θ β β − < − .  
 











) r ˆ ( ) 1 (
A H ˆ τ Ψ
β
θ
. At equilibrium, the elite offers the contract  r ˆ , H ˆ  to the 
incumbent independently on its type, and an incumbent of type c always accepts it.   
 
Proof of proposition 2. Equation 3 sets an implicit function of corruption in terms of 
the parameters of the model. Call  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 (.) r (.) ' AS 1 r 1 L
2 = − − − − = Ψ τ Ψ θ β β . 










, where l={y,  θ,  β,  S}. Notice 
( ) Φ β β Ψ τ θ r ) 1 ( 2 (.) ' ' ) AS )( 1 ( r r L





θ Φ − =  
β β ) 1 ( 2 − − . From the SOC (see proof of proposition 1) it follows that  0 > Φ , thus, 
0 r L < ∂ ∂ . We use it for the following computations. 
 
Jurisdiction’s income: Deriving L with respect to y, applying the implicit function 
theorem, and manipulating algebraically the expression we get:   26
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Using equation 3 and reorganizing terms, we can write this derivative as: 
 
() A ' A ) 1 ( ' (.) ' ' AS ) 1 )( 1 (
r
y
r 2 β β τ τ Ψ τ θ
Φ














= , statement (a) follows. Notice that from the SOC the 
denominator in η1 is higher than its numerator, thus η1 ∈ (0,1).   
 
Office Spoils: Deriving L with respect to S, applying the implicit function theorem, using 
equation 3, and reorganizing terms we get  0
S












Elite’s power: Deriving L with respect to θ, applying the implicit function theorem, using 
equation 3, and reorganizing terms we get  0
) 1 (










. It can be also 
shown that  ( )
() ()
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Incumbent’s share: Deriving L with respect to β, applying the implicit function theorem, 
and reorganizing terms we get  r








. This derivative is positive if and only if 
β<½, and negative if and only if β>½. 
 
Proof of proposition 3. There are two possibilities to analyze the effect of y, S,θ and β 
on the detection probability. The first one is to analyze what occurs to H when any of 
these exogenous change by using equation 4. With this information and the results in 
proposition 2 we can get the final effect on δ. However, there is a simpler way to do it. 
Since at equilibrium the incumbent’s participation constraint holds with equality, we can 










, then  ( ) ( ) y r sign y sign ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂δ . 
 

















, since  0 S r < ∂ ∂ . 
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, since  0 r > ∂ ∂ θ . 
 





























. Thus,  0 > ∂ δβ δ  if and 
only if  ) 2 1 ( β β Φ − − >  (keep in mind that Φ depends also on β). Notice that when 
β<½ this condition holds.  
 
Proof of proposition 4. We apply the same strategy used in proof of proposition 3. 







δ = . 
Using it we get the following results.  
 
Jurisdiction’s income: Computing  y a ∂ ∂δ , using equation 3, and after some 
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   (A7) 
 
The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the term in parenthesis. Notice that if 
0 y r < ∂ ∂  then 4A is positive. However, when  0 y r > ∂ ∂  its sign is ambiguous. The 
sufficient condition to have  0 y a > ∂ ∂δ  is  ' (.) '
) 1 (











. Using equation A6 
and reorganizing terms we can rewrite this condition as 
A

























η .  
 


























      ( A 8 )  
  
where 
(.) AS ) 1 (






= . Notice that η3 ∈ (0,1). It is so because at equilibrium H>0, 
which implies  AS ) 1 (.)( S ) 1 (.)( r θ Ψ θ Ψ β − < − <  (see proof or proposition 1). Since 
0 S r < ∂ ∂ , the sign of A8 depends on the sign of the term in parenthesis. It follows 
that,  0 S a > ∂ ∂δ  if and only if  ) ( 1 3S S r η > ∂ ∂ . 
   28


















Incumbent’s share: Computing  β δ ∂ ∂ a , using equation 3, and after some 





















   (A9) 
 
It is direct that if β>½, then  0 r < ∂ ∂ β  and so  0 a > ∂ ∂ β δ . However, if β<½ the sign of 
A9 is ambiguous. The sufficient condition to have  0 a > ∂ ∂ β δ  is  2 1 r βη β < ∂ ∂ , 
otherwise expression in A9 is negative.  
 
Centralized Model. Assume there are J>1 elites demanding corruption to the central 
incumbent (one in each of the J jurisdictions) indexed by j and endowed with economic 
power θj. At equilibrium, the citizens’ strategies are exactly the same we described in 
the decentralized game (see proof of proposition 1). Thus, let us study the behaviour of 
the rest of the players.  
 






j H r ) 1 ( − − = β π , subject to 






c r r ),  0 H
c
j ≥ ,  τ ≤ ≤
c
j r 0 ,  τ ≤
c r , and taking as given 
c
i r   j i ≠ ∀ . The first 
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j π  strictly 
decreases in 
c
j H , then the elite chooses 
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c H H . We assume the 
parameters of the model are such that  0 H
c
j > . This reduces the elite j problem to the 
following programme: 
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β π  
s.t.   τ ≤ ≤
c
j r 0  and  τ ≤
c r    
 
At equilibrium, the level of corruption in region j must satisfy:   





















β  (A5) 
 
Equation A5 represents the corruption reaction curve of elite j. With the J system of 
equation, we can solve for the level of corruption in each jurisdiction. However, 
equation A5 also defines implicitly the national per capita level of corruption 
c r . Notice 
that the equilibrium representation of national corruption under centralization is exactly 
the same we obtained for the level of corruption under decentralization in jurisdiction j. 
The rest of equilibrium conditions are getting by following the same steps we used in 
proposition 1.   
 
 
Data Set Description 
 
Corruption Index: Originally ranking from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating lower corruption. 
Rescaled from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating lower corruption. Source: International Country 
Risk Guide. Taken from Fisman and Gatti (2002).    
 
Decentralization: Total expenditure of subnational (state, and local) government over 
total spending by all levels (state, local, and central) of government. Source: 
Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Found. Taken from Fisman and 
Gatti (2002). 
 
GDP: Real GDP per capita in constant dollars, chain series, expressed in international 
price, base 1996. Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1.  
 
Civil Liberties: Gastil index of civil liberties. It takes values from 1 to 7, where 7 refers 
to the highest level of freedom. Source: Freedom House.   
 
Population: Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1. 
 
Government Size: Total government expenditure divided by DGP. Source: Heston, 
Summers, and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1. 
 
Legal Origin: Origin of a country’s legal system. These dummy variables classify the 
legal origin in five groups: (1) English common Law; (2) Socialist laws; (3) French 
Commercial Code; (4) German Commercial Code; (5) Scandinavian Commercial Code. 
Source: La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer, Vishny (1999).     
 